In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” viii comes to fruition.
Epistemic Injustice in Epistemology.
Germane to advancing this analysis of wrongs done to a speaker by acts of testimonial injustice is a distinction Edward Craig35 draws “between a person’s telling me something and my being able to tell something from observations of him”: Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: Civil War American History: Retrieved 8 March As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems.
Kathleen Lennon – – Philosophical Quarterly 59 No keywords specified fix it. Stereotypes and the practices they engender are no one’s and everyone’s within a social imagination where members of episteic society readily grant them “cognitive sanctuary”, to borrow Fricker’s apt phrase 38, n.
Thus, too, where Fricker holds ethics and politics apart, I see them as co-constitutive in ways that the “social imaginary” better captures.
Epistemic Injustice – Paperback – Miranda Fricker – Oxford University Press
A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. A Critique of Hermeneutical Injustice. Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. It deserves, and will surely command, widespread attention.
Oxford University Press Retrieved from ” https: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. The appeal must be to exemplary instances and events in which people have managed to move imaginatively beyond damaging practices and policies, have enlisted a critical mass of like-minded others to initiate the new meanings, the collective political change, the nascent just society, that is the moral-political goal of systematically countering epistemic injustice.
They can “inhibit the very formation of self” 55Fricker rightly suggests.
Miranda Fricker – Wikipedia
Injustlce Spaulding – – Philosophical Issues 26 1. Ebook This title is available as an ebook. Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3: Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical episremic of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice.
Sherman – – Social Epistemology 30 3: The Introduction offers a clear statement of the author’s aim: History of Western Philosophy.
This is more than a mere terminological difference: Publications Pages Publications Pages. In its structural modality it is dispersed through the social order where it operates impersonally, almost imperceptibly, yet surely.
Yet although a collective social imagination can be “an injusticee and epistemic liability” it is also, in her view, a “mighty resource for social change” In short, they are wronged in their capacity as knowers 21and especially so by what Fricker calls “tracker prejudices” which are systematic in their capacity to “track” a person of that social type or kind across an entire repertoire of activities, of which economic, educational, professional, sexual, legal, political, religious practices provide a representative sampling Epistemic Injustice and Illness.
Heather Battaly – – Philosophy Compass 3 4: In chapter 2 the analysis expands to focus on stereotypes as themselves stereotypical vehicles of prejudice, in what Fricker calls “the credibility economy” 30 ff.
No categories specified categorize this paper. In this kind of case, Fricker argues that as well as there being an injustice caused injkstice possible outcomes such as the speaker missing a promotion at workthere is a testimonial injustice: Laura Beeby – eppistemic Proceedings of the Fricler Society 3pt3: Yet she acknowledges a widespread human susceptibility to relying on negatively, harmfully prejudiced stereotypes, and shows how difficult it is unequivocally to attribute culpability to their users, given that stereotypes and images “can operate beneath the radar of our ordinary doxastic self-scrutiny, sometimes even despite beliefs to the contrary” Francesco Pupa – – Metaphilosophy 39 Thus when “some social groups are unable to dissent from distorted understandings of their social experiences”, they are blocked in their efforts to claim recognition for the consequent harms.
Prejudice, as Fricker well knows, is “a powerful visceral force” 98 condoned, perpetuated, and insulated against condemnation in social-cultural situations where there are no obvious reasons, no pay-offs, no rewards for examining it or, a fortiorifor attempting to purge it.
Her readers will look forward to the next phase of this creative, vitally important project. A Journal of Philosophy injutice 3: Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: Subscriber Login Email Address.
Power and the Ethics of Knowing. As a result, Epistemic Injustice makes a significant contribution, not just to epistemology, but frciker all of the disciplines.