Fred Dretske grounds, or reasons, when the question ‘How does S know?’ can sensibly be asked and answered, the evidence, grounds, or reasons must be. Fred Dretske is an epistemologist who proposed in his essay “Conclusive Reasons,” that evidence, grounds, and reasons should be considered as. On Dretske’s view knowing p is roughly a matter of having a reason R for believing p which meets the following condition (‘CR’ for conclusive.
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For example, I do not know not – biv: To say of these items that they are not individually closed is to say that the following modes closure principles, with or concluive the parenthetical qualifications, are false: While proponents of closure have responses to these arguments, they also argue, somewhat in the style of G.
Now consider lotteryesque propositions. But why say that relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge are in tension with K? For a relevant alternatives theorist, this tenet suggests that we can know something p only if dtetske can rule out not-p but we can know things that entail p even if we cannot rule out not-pwhich opens up the possibility that there are cases that violate K. Assuming that I would believe barn if I saw one of the blue fakes, then my belief barn does not safely indicate its truth.
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Epistemic Closure (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
I am also justified in believing that ticket 2 will lose, and that 3 will lose, and so on. If, while knowing pS believes q because S knows that p entails qthen S knows q.
Jonathan Lowe John R. Broad Michael Burke C. However, this assumption is false HawthorneLuper If R were to hold, q ‘s alternatives would not. Instead, it might be p itself, which is, after all, a justified belief. The latter formula expresses a connection between R and P which is strong enough, I submit, to permit us to say that if 2 is true, then R is a conclusive reason for P.
Why say SI underwrites K? First, we say that an alternative to pAis relevant if and only if the following condition is met:. Then we are well on our way to accepting some version of PCsuch as, for example:. Even if we reject this principle, it does not follow that justification is not closed under entailment, as Peter Klein pointed out.
Nonetheless, they are controversial. It occurs to you that zeb entails not-muleit is not the case that the animal in the cage is a cleverly disguised mule rather than a zebra.
Suppose p entails q.
As examples of modes of gaining, sustaining and extending knowledge Dretske suggested perception, testimony, proof, memory, indication, and information. However, each version of the straight principle is false, since we can know one thing, pbut fail to see that p entails q, or for some other reason fail to believe q.
Sign in to use this feature. Still, Dretske might abandon the notion of a limiting proposition in favor of the notion of elusive propositions, and cite, in favor of his conclusive reasons view, and against Kthe facts that we cannot know elusive claims but we can know things that imply them.
Dretske pointed outn. So the tracking account is a relevant alternatives approach. The Argument From Not Easily Knowable Propositions Another anticlosure argument is that there are some sorts of propositions we cannot know unless perhaps we take extraordinary measures, yet such propositions are entailed by mundane claims whose truth we do know. We might take the position that if we believe some proposition p on the basis of its probability, nothing less than a probability of 1 will suffice to enable us to know that it is true.
Some final observations can be made using Roderick Firth’s distinction between propositional and doxastic justification. In response to this first version of the argument from the analysis of knowledge, some theorists e.
More to the point at hand, when we claim that we know, of some proposition, that it is true, that claim is itself subject to error; often, seeing what follows from a knowledge claim prompts us to reassess and even withdraw our claim, instead of concluding, of the things that follow from it, that we know that they are true.
The Argument From the Analysis of Knowledge 2. A similar move could be defended against the tracking theorists when they deny the closure of knowledge: This is to require that one’s belief safely indicates its own truth. If we understand reliability as tracking theorists do, we will reject closure. This idea that causes matter goes back to Frank Ramsey. We may also simplify the analyses. Contemporary Perspectives on SkepticismM. For Dretske, the negation of a proposition p is automatically a relevant alternative since condition CRA is automatically met; that is, it is vacuously true that:.
As for lottery propositions: What is more, both Dretske’s and Nozick’s accounts have the odd implication that I know there is a barn if I base my belief on my red barn percepts yet I fail to know this if, in basing it on my barn percepts, I ignore the barn’s color. Find it on Scholar. One response is that cases such as Dretske’s do not count against Jbut rather against the following principle of the transmissibility of evidence: On the strength of these assumptions, skeptics argue that we do not know all sorts of commonsense claims that entail the falsity of skeptical hypotheses.
That is, in the close worlds to the actual world in which not-p holds, S does not believe p. Hence, if a person S knows p on the basis of RS is in a position dretake know q on the basis of Rwhere q follows from p.